In this paper I study the information acquisition process in a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs about future prices. This is instrumental to investigate the eects of nancial literacy on market volatility. I posit that nancial literacy aects the cost of acquiring information on the asset payo and show that the eect on the market volatility is cross-partial non-monotone and depends on the uncertainty of the fundamentals. I conclude that policies aimed at reducing the nancial information acquisition cost increase aggregate informativeness and, in a scenario with high uncertainty of the fundamentals, reduce the market volatility. The main intuition is that lower information cost for the less literate households leads them to acquire more private information and to trade more actively. Having more private information revealed by the market price aects positively market volatility. On the other hand, with low uncertainty in the fundamental, the positive informational eect is oset by the negative eect of having more traders with less precise beliefs, who trade more conservatively. Moreover, reducing the information acquisition cost is not welfare improving if the policy makers introduce a proportional tax on the excess return to nance the policy expenditures.
Introduction
Due to the changes occurred in the welfare state and in the ageing path of the industrialized countries, the burden and the risk of the nancial choices shifted onto the individuals. Thus, the role played by the nancial literacy in the nancial decision process of an investor captures the attention of the policy makers.
1
Lack of abilities or skills to manage lifetime nancial wealth, such as misunderstanding of nancial matters or underestimating current opportunities and future needs, becomes a crucial issue in the policy makers' agenda, especially during the times of crisis. Identifying the "vulnerable population" and providing nancial education are the two main policies implemented by the nancial regulators.
2 However, it is still under debate the eects of these policies, especially the latter. While from the theoretical point of view, partial equilibrium models provide rationale for nancial education programs (Jappelli and Padula, 2011) , the empirical literature shows mixed evidences about the individual benets (Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) , Christelis et al. (2010) , Lusardi and Tufano (2009) ). In order to explain non-optimal nancial performance of the households, such as low equity market participation or low level of portfolio diversication, a stream of household nance literature focus on the individuals abilities to process information: cost of acquiring information (Peress (2005) , Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) ), overcondence (Odean, 1998) , awareness (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005) , limited cognitive abilities ( (Christelis et al., 2010) ).
I follow the framework based on the strategic substitutability in the information acquisition to analize the eect of policies aimed at improving the individual nancial abilities, such as reducing the information acquisition cost, i.e. implementing better transparency rules for the nancial prospects or increasing the average degree of nancial literacy in the population through nancial education programs.
3
Structural models are necessary to capture the feed-back eects of such policies on the individual behaviour, in particular the informational exter-1 I use the following denition of nancial literacy: degree of knowledge of basic nancial concept, ability to manage personal nances, and condence of own choices made in a complex nancial environment. For a review of nancial literacy denitions Remund (2010 ), Hung et al. (2009 . 2 According to the denition provided by OECD-INFE, the "vulnerable populations" include groups likely to face economic challenges and less likely to fully participate in the nancial mainstream. These groups may include, but are not limited to: youth and young adults, the unemployed and under-employed, low-income consumers, those with little or no savings, other consumers outside of or partially outside of the workforce (for example, people with disabilities), and other vulnerable sociodemographic groups such as women and racial and ethnic minorities. See OECD website for a list of nancial education programs: http://www.nancial-education.org/home.html 3 I model explicitly how agents acquire information and how nancial literacy aects this process. My paper follows the literature on information acquisition with costly precision.
nalities, and to derive asset pricing implications. My approach takes into account the feedback eects within a general equilibrium framework. I investigate the eect of a reduction in the information acquisition cost for the less literate agents on the volatility of the market. As a proxy, I use market price variance. The impact of the policy on the market volatility is cross-partial non-monotone and depends on the uncertainty of the market fundamentals. Even if the aggregate informativeness always increases, the market volatility decreases with high uncertainty in the fundamentals and it increases with low uncertainty. The main intuition is that lower information cost for the less literate households leads them to acquire more private information and to trade more actively. Therefore, more private information revealed by the market price aects positively market volatility. On the other hand, with low uncertainty in the fundamentals, the positive informational eect is oset by the negative eect of having more traders with less precise beliefs, who trade more conservatively.
Similar CARA-Gaussian models were used to explain inequalities among households, e.g. Verrecchia (1982) through heterogeneous risk aversion and Peress (2004) through heterogeneous initial wealth. The main implication is that wealthier households gain more from purchasing the private information, improving their Sharpe ratio. Thus, they end up to be more informed.
My model diers in the source of heterogeneity. I consider heterogeneous information acquisition costs. The results show that more nancially literate agents are, more information they purchase and more revealing market prices are. The impact on market volatility is cross-partial non-monotone and depends on the fundamentals uncertainty. I conclude that the policy makers can reduce the volatility of the market only in a scenario with high uncertainty, namely when the nancial information is more valuable. Conversely, with low uncertainty, improving the nancial market transparency leads to higher volatility. Using the model, I perform a policy exercise letting the policy makers provide nancial education programs. Reducing the information acquisition cost is not welfare improving if the policy makers introduce a proportional tax on 4 I gure out a situation where agents face the same nancial report and extract signals on the true payo paying a cost. More expert they are, lower costs they have, more precise signals will be. Their ability to understand nancial information is exogenous. Padula and Pettinicchi (2012) take it endogenous, letting the agents optimally choose the amount of nancial literacy they want to accumulate. the excess return to nance the policy expenditures.
The paper is organized as follow: in Section 2 I set up the model, in Section 3 I characterize the equilibrium and I discuss the implications of the model. Section 4 performs the welfare analysis and the last section concludes and points out further research steps. All the proofs are collected in the Appendixes.
Model
In this model, the agents face two choices: in the rst period, they have to choose if and how much information they want to purchase. In the second period, if and how to trade in the market. There are two primitive assets available for trading. A riskless asset, that is perfect elastically supplied, pays a rate of return r (R = 1 + r). A risky asset, with price p, pays a payo π with π ∼ N (µ π , τ −1 π ). 5 Short selling is allowed and a tax rate t aects the capital gains of the traders.
The per capita supply of the risky asset is θ ∼ N (µ θ , τ
trading.
6 The fundamentals, π and θ, are mutually independent random variables and their joint distribution is common knowledge.
Agents and policy makers
Agents dier in their ability to acquire information. Heterogeneity is expressed by c, that aects the costly information acquisition process. Without loss of generality, I assume two types of agents. Type L (literate agents) with low cost and type H (illiterate agents) with high cost of acquiringnancial information. J = L H is the set of all the agents. Both types of agents maximize the same concave utility function of their nal wealth.
For tractability, I assume CARA utility function with absolute risk aversion coecient ρ: U (W ) = − 1 ρ e −ρW . 7 Population of agents has mass one and, for 5 The assumption of unbounded normally distributed payos allows to work out a closed form solution. Alternative distributional assumptions on payo shocks are used by Barlevy and Veronesi (2007) and Breon-Drish (2012) . 6 The introduction of an exogenous aggregate risk allows to avoid the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. With an extra noise, market price are not fully revealing, therefore agents still have some incentives to purchase information. In the literature, dierent interpretations characterize this assumption: presence of irrational noise traders, random endowment shocks (Biais et al., 2010) or other types of individual shocks such as liquidity needs (Wang, 1994) . 7 The assumed shape of the utility function fully satises the participation principle: given a positive equity premium, all agents invest money in the risky asset, regardless of the degree of risk aversion or the riskiness of the asset. Empirical studies show that the participation principle fails in reality (the stock-holding puzzle): limited market participation and heterogeneous portfolio behaviours characterize real nancial markets Bertaut (1995), Guiso et al. (2003) ). each type, there are enough agents so that the law of large numbers applies.
8
The participation in a nancial education program provided by the policy makers motivates the dierences between the two types of agents. Those agents who participate in the program become more literate and reduce their costs of acquiring nancial information. However, the policy makers face a monetary cost to provide the nancial education program. It is proportional to the fraction of agents who participate in. I denote with λ the fraction of literate agents in the model. The policy makers are budget constrained and they must nance the expenditures of the program with the tax revenue from the trading. The policy makers optimally set the tax rate t, in order to satisfy the budget constraint such that the cost of the policy equals the expected scal revenue.
Information structure
Once π is realized but not revealed, each agent can purchase an unbiased signal s about the risky asset payo:
where is a white noise, independent of π, θ, and across agents. Agents can purchase private signal precision x paying an opportunity cost C(x, c).
Formally, the cost of acquiring an amount x of precision is modelled by a continuous and twice dierentiable function C(x, c) over x ∈ R + that is strictly convex: C x > 0, C xx ≥ 0 and C c > 0, C cc ≥ 0. It is continuous at x = 0: C(0, c) = 0, ∀c. And lim x→+∞ C(x, c) = +∞. The two properties imply that a totally uninformative signal is costless and a fully revealing signal is innitely expensive. Moreover, the marginal cost C x is increasing in c (C x c > 0): acquiring information at the margin is more costly for less literate agents. These assumptions ensure the existence of a solution for the information choice. To illustrate the main intuition, I provide a simplied example that I will use to derive the numerical outcomes.
Example (Cost Function) . The cost function is:
To solve the model, I focus on a partially revealing noisy rational expectation equilibrium. All agents have rational expectations in the sense of Hellwig (1980) . After having privately observed unbiased signals, the agents transfer their private information to the market price through their asset demand. Then, the market price reveals some information about the true value 8 Within the group agents dier only for the realization of their private signal, if they purchase one. Moreover, I posit that they do not realize they can act strategically, aecting market price through their informative choice and their asset demand.
of the risky asset and the agents use it as an informative signal. However, the market price is not fully revealing given the noisy trading. Following the literature, I look for an equilibrium in which the market price is a linear function of the fundamentals: pR = a + bπ − dθ where the coecients a, b, d
are determined in equilibrium, imposing fully rationality of the agents.
9
I denote the agent j's information set as F j = {s j , p} where s j denotes the agent j's private signal and it is informative only if the agent j acquires some information precision.
Timing
There are two periods. In period 1, the planning period, the agent can purchase a private signal s, choosing its precision x. In period 2, the trading period, after having observed her private signal realization s and the market price p, the agent trades in a competitive market, choosing her portfolio share α. In the trading period, the agent faces a portfolio allocation problem where she needs to choose the share of the portfolio invested in the risky asset, in order to maximize her expected utility. At this point in time, the precision x is already purchased and the initial welfare is reduced by the amount C spent for acquiring the private signal. The agent observes a private and a public signal (the market price) and computes the posterior beliefs about the asset payo: E[π|F] and V ar [π|F] .
In the planning period, the agent chooses how much private signal precision x she wants and pays the monetary cost C(x, c), that is aected by 9 Linearity is a standard assumption in the literature when the aim of the research is to nd a closed form solution for the price function. Working with non-linear price functions provides a more general approach but loses the tractability of the solution.
the type specic parameter c ∈ {c L , c H }, the ability of acquiring nancial information.
I describe the individual problem in each period and I provide the denition of an equilibrium within the family of the noisy rational expectation equilibria. Proposition 1 claims the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. In the last part of the section 3, I discuss the results of the model.
The trading period
In this period, each agent maximizes the utility of the nal wealth, optimally allocating the nancial portfolio:
subject to the budget constraint:
where R p is the portfolio return:
The tax rate aects only the capital gains of the risky asset and the sunk cost C is given by the information choice made in the previous period.
The optimal share invested in risky assets diers between agents, depending on the signal observed and the precision purchased. In the trading period, all the information choices are already done and each trading agent transfers some of the information purchased to the market price through the risky asset demand. So, the market price partially reveals the private information. Therefore, when the rational agents form their posterior beliefs and formulate their asset demands, they take into account the aggregate informativeness and transform the market price into an unbiased public signal.
The indirect utility for agent j'
The planning period
In the planning period, each agent maximizes the indirect utility with respect to the information choice, the precision of the private signal. To simplify the notation, I drop the subscript j and write:
where the expected utility is computed over the joint probability distribution of s and p. Recall that signal precision x aects, by assumption, only the distribution of the private signal s. The individual optimal precision x * (Θ) depends directly on the same type specic information acquisition cost and indirectly on the other type specic information acquisition cost through the aggregate informativeness. In the information market, it must hold the equilibrium condition, such that the aggregate informativeness is given by all the private information optimally acquired.
The equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium is given by an asset demand function α j and an information demand function x j for all the agents, a price function p of π and θ, and a scalar I such that:
1. x j = x * j (Θ) and α j = α * (s j , p; Θ) solve the maximization problems.
2. p clears the market for the risky asset:
The informativeness of the price I, implied by aggregating individual precision choices, equals to the level assumed in the agents' maximization problem:
In noisy rational expectations equilibrium models, the agents make selffullling conjectures about prices and the equilibrium is dened as the set of allocations such that the agents maximize their utilities, the markets clear and the individual optimal choices are consistent with the aggregate variables.
The following proposition claims the existence and the uniqueness of an equilibrium within the family of noisy rational expectation equilibria.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique noisy rational expectation equilibrium with linear price function.
Proof. See the appendix.
Here I provide a sketch of the proof and hereafter I discuss the main features of the equilibrium. For given aggregate informativeness I, I derive the market equilibrium, computing the optimal asset demands and the equilibrium market price function. Then, I compute the optimal information choices, checking when these individual choices are consistent with the assumed aggregate informativeness.
The information choice
The optimal information choice x * is the maximum between zero and the solution of the following equation:
where k is the precision of the individual posterior beliefs after having observed the private signal and the market price: k * = τ π + x * + τ ξ is the sum of τ π , the precision of the prior beliefs, x * , the precision of the private signal and τ ξ , the precision of the public signal ξ derived by the market price. 10
The cost of acquiring nancial information aects directly the choice to be informed. The agents with an information acquisition cost greater than the endogenous threshold c(Θ) optimally choose to remain uniformed.
Therefore, the threshold identies the lowest ability of information acquisition according to which is worthy to be informed and it is given implicitly by the following formula:
Let consider a policy aimed at making the illiterate agents more informed and, therefore, more active traders. The policy makers can intervene either reducing the cost of acquiring nancial information of the illiterates, that can be seen as the baseline level of nancial literacy, e.g. the knowledge that an individual develops in the schooling period, or increasing the fraction of literate agents, providing nancial education.
In the former case, policies such as increasing the mandatory years of schooling or improving the transparency of the nancial markets, aect the baseline ability of acquiring nancial information. I focus on the distance between the endogenous threshold c(Θ) and c H . It could be seen as a proxy of the access to the information market because the policy aects the behaviour of the agent only if c H moves from left to right of the threshold. Therefore, I
treat the distance between the information acquisition cost of the illiterates and the triggering threshold as a measure of the per capita cost that policy makers face to make the program eective. In Table 1 , I keep c L constant and I make c H to decrease, showing lower degree of illiteracy for the illiterate agents. In the rst column, I report the optimal information choice of the illiterates. In the last column, positive values indicate that the information acquisition cost is higher than the threshold: greater values imply a more expensive policy to make informed the illiterates.
In the latter case, providing programs related to nancial matters allows to change the fraction of the literate agents. However, the policy increases the aggregate informativeness and pushes out of the information market the 10 See the Appendix A for the derivation of ξ (5.1) and τ ξ (5.4).
illiterates, so that with more literates around, the illiterates prefer to remain uninformed. In Table 2 , I report information choices for dierent fraction of literates. Increasing λ has similar eects on the aggregate informativeness I and on the optimal information choice of the literates x * L as reducing the information acquisition cost of the illiterates c H . However, the eect on the optimal information choice of the illiterates is dierent: the illiterates become uninformed with higher λ and informed with lower c H . This is due to the fact that acquiring information depends also on the aggregate informativeness. More information the market price reveals, less incentives the agents have to acquire information. Dierentiating equation (3.1) with respect to I, I can show that the optimal information choice is a non increasing function of the aggregate informativeness. Formally, I have:
which shows the strategic substitutability between private and public information.
Therefore, the policy aimed at reducing the information acquisition cost of the illiterates aects only indirectly the information choice of the literates: more aggregate informativeness induces them to reduce their acquired information:
On the other hand, the overall eect on the information choice of the illiterates is positive: lower information acquisition cost leads them to acquire more information:
The portfolio choice
The optimal portfolio share is the standard solution for the maximization problem of an agent with CARA utility function. The agent optimally chooses to trade when she believes that the expected excess return is positive.
For each agent j ∈ J, the optimal portfolio share α j depends on the precision of the posterior belief, k j , and on the expected excess return conditional to the agent's informative set: E[π|F j ] − pR:
and the following condition holds:
To highlight the role played by the information in the portfolio choice, I rewrite the optimal portfolio share:
where the rst term is the optimal share of an uninformed agent who follows only market feelings, i.e. the public knowledge embodied in the prior beliefs 11 See the appendix B. 
The average agent has posterior precision:
After having substituted a, b and d and few algebra steps, the equilibrium market price can be rewritten as:
It is driven by two components: the posterior belief of the average agent and the discount on the price demanded by the traders to be compensated for the uncertainty due to the noisy supply.
The market price is random because it depends on the realization of the fundamentals. Given the assumed probability distribution, the equilibrium market price is a Gaussian with mean:
K µ θ and variance:
12 When I = 0, no agents purchase private information. There are only uniformed and noisy traders in the markets. The market price just reects the noisy supply and the agents hold risky assets in order to oset it. When I → ∞, (1 − τ ξ 1 I+τ ξ ) goes to zero and agent j does not purchase any risky assets: α * j = 0. The market price fully reveals the value of the fundamentals, therefore there are no reasons to trade.
Hereafter I control the impact on the variance of the market price of the changes in exogenous factors such as the uncertainty of the fundamentals and the risk aversion of the agents.
In table 3, I show how fundamentals' uncertainty, τ π and τ θ , aects the market price variance. Lower uncertainty about the asset payo and the asset supply decreases the market price variance, with wider range for the former (table 3(a)) than for the latter (table 3(b)). The market price reects the uncertainty in the fundamentals, but the impact of the noisy in the asset supply is mitigated by the aggregate informativeness, the risk aversion and the tax rate.
Risk aversion does not monotonically aects volatility. Either with high and low risk aversion, the market price variance is higher than when the agents are medium risk averse.
13 This result is driven by the impact of the risk aversion on the coecients of the fundamentals in the price function.
Less risk averse agents (low ρ) heavily trade and transfer their private information to the market price. The market price is more sensible to the asset payo shocks (high b) and is less sensible to the noisy supply shocks (low d),
given the ability of the traders to absorb the shocks of the noisy supply.
Increasing the risk aversion leads the agents to acquire more private information and to reduce their trade. Therefore, the aggregate informativeness increases but the sensitivity of the market price to the asset payo shocks decreases. Moreover, the reduced trading of the agents implies that the market dries up and the sensitivity of the market price to the noisy supply shock increases but at lower rate with respect to the decrease of the sensitivity to the asset payo shocks. The total eect is that higher risk aversion leads to lower market price variance.
This relationship holds up to a point, according to which an increase in risk aversion let the agents reduce their acquisition of private information, given the lower value attached to it. Therefore, the aggregate informativeness decreases and reinforces the decrease of the sensitivity of the market price to the asset payo shocks. Moreover, the direct eect of the reduced trading and the indirect eect of lower aggregate informativeness increases the sensitivity of the market price to the noisy supply shocks. The eect of the risk aversion on the market price variance changes and increasing risk aversion leads to higher volatility in the market price.
I do not go deep into the explanation of the mechanism underlying the eect of the risk aversion on the volatility of the market price. I focus on the eects of exogenous variables that are under the control of the policy makers: the tax rate through scal policies, the cost of acquiring information, improving transparency rules of the nancial markets, and the amount of literate agents, providing nancial education programs.
13 In Table 4 I report the market price variance for increasing degrees of risk aversion under dierent scenarios of uncertainty in the fundamentals. 14 The latter,
, is always non positive. The result is due to two eects: the rst eect would drive up the aggregate informativeness. The policy allows the illiterate agents to acquire information at a lower cost and, therefore, they optimally acquire more information. The second eect would drive down the aggregate informativeness: higher private information acquired by the illiterates implies higher aggregate informativeness and this leads both types to reduce their acquisition of private information. The rst eect dominates the second one and the policy leads to higher aggregate informativeness. Only if it is optimal to remain uninformed for the illiterates, the impact of the policy on the aggregate informativeness is null.
The former term, dσ 2 pR dI , is cross partial non-monotone. In order to study it, I collapse the behaviour of the two types into the ctitious average agent I described before. The impact of the aggregate informativeness on the market price variance is negative when the market price variance is greater than a threshold, that it is given by two terms. The rst one is the prior variance of the asset payo, weighted by the sensitivity of the market price to the asset payo shocks, i.e. ), is high enough, i.e., the contribution of the noisy supply to the overall market volatility is small.
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I summarize the impact of the policy on market volatility with the following formula:
The policy makers can manipulate the information acquisition cost of the illiterates and this intervention aects the aggregate informativeness through the agents' behaviour. The behaviour of the ctitious average agent helps at illustrating the eect of the policy on market stability, which depends on the gap between the market price variance and prior variance of the asset payo, and on the sensitivity of the posterior belief variance with respect to the aggregate informativeness.
The main intuition is that implementing a policy aimed at lowering the information costs for the illiterate agents leads them to acquire more private information and to trade more actively. Therefore, more private information Recall that the market volatility reects both the volatility of the asset and of the noisy supply, given the assumed market structure.
an increased amount of literate traders is cross partial non-monotone. As it is shown in table 6, the market price variance decreases in λ when there is high fundamentals' uncertainty and increases with low uncertainty.
The expected excess return
The incentive to trade is the expected excess return: f = E[π|F] − pR. At the planning period, it is random variable made by the equilibrium market price and by the posterior beliefs about the payo. The latter is itself a random variable normally distributed with mean and variance:
The expectation is the prior mean of the risky asset and it is the same for both types. The variance of the posterior beliefs diers between types: it is higher for the literates than for the illiterates. The literates purchase more information and they end up, on average, with posterior beliefs close to the true value. The illiterate agents rely less on their private signal and their posterior beliefs are, on average, closer to the market price.
Thus, I compute the distribution of the expected excess return: f ∼ N (µ f , σ 2 f ):
The expected gain from being a trader is given by the mean of the noisy supply scaled by the risk aversion and the posterior beliefs precision of the average agent. It comes from the opportunity to use the informational advantages against those agents who need to trade for exogenous reasons. It is decreasing in the aggregate informativeness.
16
The variance of the expected excess return diers between types. There is a common part d 2 τ θ that refers to the volatility of the noisy supply scaled by the square of the sensitivity of the market price to the shocks of the noisy supply, i.e. the market depth. Lower volatility of the noisy supply and higher liquidity of the market imply lower volatility of the expected excess return.
The second part,
, shows the informational gain achieved by one type with respect to the average agent. Those with more precise posterior beliefs take into account greater return due to the opportunity to use their informational advantages. However, the informational advantages decrease as the aggregate informativeness increases.
16 With fully revealing price (I = ∞), the expected gain is zero. With less revealing price (0 < I < ∞), the opportunity to take advantage of the noisy traders is shared with less traders, increasing the per capita expected gain.
Welfare analysis
In this section, I use the model to derive the policy implications of nancial education programs. Let the policy makers provide nancial education to a given amount of agents λ, making them more nancial literate and able to acquire nancial information at a lower cost.
I assume that the expenditures of the nancial education program is equal to λ plus a factor that it is proportional to the distance between the current ability and the earned ability after having attended the program (c H − c L ). The policy expenditures is nanced through general taxation: the policy makers set the tax rate t on the excess return of the traders. The budget constraint is satised in expectation terms over the joint distribution of the fundamentals:
. In the model, λ does not only capture the cost of the policy, but also aects the incentive to become informed and to trade actively. On the other hand, the ability acquired by the agents who attend the nancial education program, c L , aects their information choice, but also the information choice of the illiterates, through the aggregate informativeness. I study the impact of the policy moving along these two dimensions: the fraction of the literates and the inequality in nancial information acquisition cost. In Table 7 and Table 8 I report the tax rate that satises the public budget constraint.
In Table 7 , I keep λ = 0.25 and I let the inequality in the nancial information acquisition costs increase, i.e. higher productivity of the nancial education program due to higher quality of the courses. The results
show an increasing tax rate in the inequality. Increasing the ability of the agents who attend the nancial education program implies higher aggregate informativeness due to their information choice. The feed-back eect is to decrease the expected scal revenue, so that the policy makers need to set a higher tax rate to nance the policy expenditures. The expected utility of the literates increases due to the informational benet, while that for the illiterate decreases, driving down the aggregate welfare. In gure 3 I report the expected utility of the two types and a measure of the aggregate welfare W U given by the weighted sum of the individuals' expected utility.
The left panel shows lower aggregate utility for increasing inequality in the information acquisition costs.
In Table 8 If the policy makers provide nancial education programs nanced through general taxation on the market excess returns, the model shows a decreasing aggregate welfare in the population coverage and in the productivity of the program, due to the higher tax rate needed to nance the policy expenditures. Only in the latter case, the expected utility of the agents who attend the program increases because the informational benet of the programs are greater than the taxes to be paid.
Further research will take into account participation costs in order to explain limited market participation and let the individual amount of nancial literacy be endogenously chosen by the agents.
Appendix A -Proof of proposition 1
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium, I need to prove the existence and the uniqueness of an equilibrium market price that linearly depends on the fundamentals, π and θ, and clears the market.
In equilibrium, all the agents maximize their utility. I compute optimal asset demands and the equilibrium market price for given aggregate informativeness I. In the following step of the proof, I derive the optimal information choices and I work out the equilibrium in the information market, proving the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of the model.
Lemma 1 (Individual asset demands and Market Price). For given aggregate informativeness I, the optimal portfolio share for agent j ∈ J is given by:
and the equilibrium market price is pR = a + bπ − dθ where the coecients a, b and d are determined in (5.3).
Proof. The proof is given in ve steps. In the rst step, I guess a price linear function and I derive the informationally equivalent public signal ξ from the price function. In the second step, I compute the mean and the variance of the posterior beliefs given the two unbiased signals, ξ and s. In the third step, I derive the optimal asset demand. In the fourth step, I derive market clearing conditions and, in the last step, I impose rationality and determine the coecients of the guessed linear price function.
Recall that the joint distribution of the payo, the supply and the signals is:
Step 1 : The agents guess a price function linear in π (future payo ) and θ (noisy supply):
Applying the law of large number within each group of traders, I have that j j dj = 0 with probability one. Therefore, I can rewrite the price function as:
The agents use the observed private signals to update their prior beliefs π ∼ N (µ π , τ −1 π ). The private signal is unbiased by construction, s|π ∼ N (π, x −1 ), and conditionally independent from the prior belief, µ π , E[(µ π −π)(s−π)] = 0. Rational agents use the price as a public signal. It is not unbiased: E[pR|π] = a − dµ θ + bπ. To apply Bayesian updating, the agents transform the price in an informationally equivalent variable ξ:
Step 2 : Each agent j observes F j = {s j , p} ≡ {s j , ξ} and updates her prior beliefs with the two Gaussian signals. Using the formula for the multivariate normal distribution (Degroot (2004) , p. 55), the posterior expectation is given by:
where the precision of the posterior belief k j is given by the sum of precisions of the prior, of the private signal and of the public signal:
Step 3 : Maximizing the CARA utility function with respect to the control variable α, each agent solves the following: 18
The nal wealth can be rewritten as:
where the rst condition identies the losses and the second one the gains.
Only the capital gains are aected by the tax rate.
18 I use the log-normal distribution properties and I drop subscript j to simplify notation. I will restore it when I aggregate the individual asset demands.
Before π is revealed and after having observed the private signal, the nal wealth is a random variable and the conditional expectation is:
while the variance is:
After having substituted the expectation and the variance of the nal wealth in (5.2), we can solve the maximization problem. The optimal risky asset demand for agent j is:
The amount of wealth in risky assets depends on the posterior precision k j , the risk aversion ρ, the tax rate t and the expected excess return of the risky investment.
Step 4 : The equilibrium price clears the market for the risky asset. Aggregating over all traders yields the aggregate demand:
I apply the weak law of large numbers for independent and identically distributed random variables with the same mean, such that j s j dj = π.
Then, imposing market clearing condition holds the following equation: 
Step 5 : I impose rationality. ξ involves undetermined coecients b, d. I substitute the expression for ξ = π −
and, rearranging the terms, I
have:
and I substitute it back into the price function. I nd out the following determined coecients.
To simplify the notation, I rewrite the precision of the public signal ξ:
Lemma 2. For given aggregate informativeness I, for all the agents with c < c(Θ), the optimal information choice x * solves the following equation:
where c(Θ) is given by (5.7).
Proof. In order to solve for the information choice x * , rst I need to compute the indirect utility: v(s j , p; Θ) = E[U (W 2 (α * j ))|s j , ξ]. Then, I need to compute the expected value. It depends on the rst two moments of the expected return of trading a unit of risky asset. Once I derive the expected indirect utility function, I apply the concave maximum theorem to nd out the optimal information choice x * and to identify the threshold c(Θ), according to which is worthy to be informed.
Step 1 The outcome of the rst step is the indirect utility function. For agent j ∈ J, it is:
I derive it substituting the optimal asset demand back into the expected utility (5.2). Thus, for each agent:
and:
Substituting back the last two terms into the indirect utility of agent j,
Once I derive the indirect utility, I need to compute the expected value.
For simplifying notation, I call f the expected return: f = E[π|s j , p] − pR that is normally distributed with mean µ f and variance σ 2 f .
Step 2 The outcome of the second step is the expected value of the indirect utility function. For agent j ∈ J, it is:
The expected return f = E[π|s, p] − pR is a normal random variable,
given that is a linear function of two normally distributed random variables.
In order to compute the expected value of the indirect utility function, I
need to compute the mean, µ f = E[E[π|s, p] − pR], and the variance, σ 2 f = V ar [E[π|s, p] − pR], of the expected excess return. I start computing the expectation of the posterior belief:
and the expectation of the market price:
Therefore, the mean of the expected excess return is:
To compute the variance, I need the variance of the posterior belief, the market price variance and the covariance of two terms:
where the variance of the posterior belief is:
The market price variance is:
and the covariance between posterior beliefs and market price is:
Thus, I can rewrite σ 2 f as:
Once I have the rst two moments of the excess return, I can compute the expected value of the indirect utility:
1 . Therefore, I can use the moment generating function of a non central χ 2
1 . This is given by the following formula:
In my case, I have:
Where the exponential term does not depend on x, given that (
. Now, rearranging all the terms, the expected value of the indirect utility for agent j is:
Step 3 The outcome of the third step is the optimal information choice x * and the threshold c(Θ). I called γ the positive expression that is independent from the control variable x:
and I rewrite the expected value of the indirect utility function as:
The objective function (5.6) is strictly concave and dened over a compact domain [0, x(c) ] where x(c) solves W 1 = C(x, c). The concave maximum theorem guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of the solution. It could be an interior or a corner solution: x * = 0 or x * = x(c).
I specify conditions over parameter space in order to characterize the solution. First, I derive FOC and I compute it at x = 0:
When it is positive, agent has incentive to acquire information, x * > 0. I call c(Θ) the value of c, such that the agent is indierent between being informed or remain uninformed. Formally, c(Θ) is implicitly given by:
Therefore, given strictly convexity of the cost function, ∀c < c, x * (I; c, Θ) > 0.
For an interior solution, it is enough to show that there exists an x ∈ [0, x(c)]
such that FOC is negative. Formally, I check when the following condition holds:
I identify a second threshold c(Θ) that it is implicitly given by:
For all c < c < c, x * (I; c, Θ) is an interior solution belonging to the set [0, x] and it is given by:
I derive implicitly the amount of information x * (I; c, Θ) that an agent optimally acquires. It depends on the nancial literacy cost c and on the aggregate informativeness I. The agent is indierent between being informed or uniformed when I goes to innity (fully revealing market price) or if c = c. For any c > c, the optimal information choice is:
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of a noisy rational expectation equilibrium, I need to check that the aggregation of the optimal information choices of the agents is equal to the amount of aggregate informativeness that agents conjecture in their maximization problems.
Lemma 3. The optimal information choices of the agents are consistent with the aggregate informativeness.
Proof. Let agents be distributed over J according a cdf G(j). Let c j be the nancial literacy of agent j ∈ J. Let assume that c j can take any values greater than c(Θ). 
19 I want to avoid the case where agents prefer to spend their whole initial wealth in the information market and nothing in the asset market. This case is possible given the form of the CARA utility function where agents take into account both the mean and the variance of the nal wealth. 20 In the paper, I assume that G(j) is a discrete distribution with mass λ on c = cL and
where y is an element of Y and x * (c j , y; Θ) is given by:
Continuity of F (y) is guaranteed by the assumption that C x is continuous. I need to prove that F maps into itself to apply xed-point Brouwer's theorem (F (y) = y). For all c j > c and y ∈ Y, x * (c j , y; Θ) ≥ 0. Moreover, given strictly convexity of the cost function, C x (0, c) ≤ C x (x * , c j ). This implies that:
Aggregating over j using the cdf G(j) implies that:
Thus, F (y) maps into itself and I proved the existence of the equilibrium. The rst term in brackets is the integral of the partial derivative of the optimal information choice with respect to the aggregate informativeness.
The second term in brackets is zero given the optimal choice x * is zero for agents with c j = c. The last term is also zero given that I set c independent with respect to y.
Dierentiating FOC I have:
As long as the assumptions about the shape of the cost function hold and given y ∈ Y ⊂ R + , I can conclude that f (y) is always non negative and f (y) is monotone. Therefore, there exists a unique value of y such that the information market is in equilibrium.
Appendix B -Tables and Graphs
If it is not dierently specied in the text, the model's parameters are the following: prior mean µ π and prior precision τ π are both equal to one. The noisy asset supply has mean zero and variance one. The risk free asset is zero return (R = 1) and the risk aversion coecient (ρ) is one. Initial wealth (W 1 ) is one. Literate agents are a fourth of the total (λ = 0.25) and their cost of acquiring information is c L = 0.01, while the information acquisition cost for the illiterates is c H = 0.03. The tax rate is set to zero. In short notation, I have that Θ is given by {R = 1,
Information choice
Reducing the information acquisition cost of the illiterates increases the acquired information of the illiterates and decreases that of the literates. Deriving (3.1) with respect to c H holds:
Similar result can be derived for:
Substituting the last equation in the previous one, I derive the reduced form
2Iτ θ ρ 2 (1−t) 2 2 < 0 and, similarly, the reduced form of
The impact of c h on the aggregate informativeness is always negative as long as the assumptions on the cost function C(x, c) hold:
The previous results holds for all c H < c(Θ). While for all c H > c(Θ), where η((s − π)
. Similarly, for the other case. > 0 is the following:
Similarly for the other cases. 
